find considerable variation in cash ETRs both across and within industries. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that firms (and/or industries) have varying degrees of success via the political process (Zimmerman 1983) . Corporations develop political strategies that allow them to compete in the public policy arena. We test whether greater benefits accrue to firms who pursue a relational approach to corporate political activity (CPA), those who invest in access to policymakers over time. We regress future long-run cash ETRs on the interaction between a measure of firm-specific history of PAC support to tax-writing members of Congress (access) and a measure of tax-specific lobbying (influence). We predict and find that tax benefits accrue to firms who have established relationships with key policymakers over time. Conditional on low levels of future cash ETR, we also predict and find that proactive firms enjoy more sustainable ETRs through time.
I. Introduction
With debates over various proposals for tax reform flooding Capitol Hill, corporations are fighting for a seat at the table. Budget deals and talk of tax reform are a time for companies to secure their current tax breaks and work toward new tax breaks. In an article aptly titled, "Crony Capitalist Blowout," the Wall Street Journal details how during the recent fiscal cliff negotiations, corporate interests and their lobbyists managed to persuade the Senate to save seventy-five special interest tax breaks (Anonymous 2013) . When Chairman Camp laid out his proposal for territorial tax reform, Ernst & Young advised its clients, "Companies that get involved now will be in a better position to react to changes as proposals evolve and to potentially influence the final outcome" (Ernst & Young 2011, page 5) . In other words, call your Congressmen today.
Prior management literature suggests that firms choose from a menu of political strategies, and that the most proactive firms, those that invest in continued exchanges with policymakers, should experience greater success in the policy arena (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Baysinger 1984) . In this study, we examine the tax benefits that firms receive as a result of their political strategy choices. In particular, we test whether greater benefits accrue to firms who pursue a relational approach to corporate political activity (CPA), those who invest in access to policymakers over time. 1 Drawing on prior literature, we construct a tax-specific measure of investments in access to policymakers based on campaign financing activity (i.e., contributions to policymakers via corporate-sponsored political action committees or PACs). We posit that investments in access via PAC contributions enhance attempts to influence tax policy via lobbying expenditures and examine whether differences in political strategies help explain variation in long-run tax avoidance.
Using long-run cash effective tax rates (ETRs) to measure of tax avoidance, Dyreng et al. (2008) find considerable variation in cash ETRs both across and within industries. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that firms (and/or industries) have varying degrees of success via the political process (Zimmerman 1983) . Indeed, in their studies, Citizens for Tax CPA has drawn renewed interest in the popular press, spotlighting the political activity and resulting tax benefits of individual companies like Electronic Arts, Altria, Verizon, General
Electric, McDonalds and many more (see Kocieniewski 2011; Lipton 2013; Rowland 2013 ).
Most of the literature on tax avoidance to date focuses on how firms respond to already existing policy in order to achieve their tax avoidance objectives. In this study, we examine a more proactive approach to tax planning. We regress future long-run cash ETR on the interaction between a measure of firm-specific history of PAC support to tax-writing members of Congress (access) and a measure of tax-specific lobbying (influence). We predict and find that the tax benefits associated with investments in influencing policy via lobbying accrue to firms who have established relationships with key policymakers (i.e., those who have made investments in gaining access to candidates over time).
Low levels of future cash ETRs do not necessarily imply consistently low cash ETRs through time. Relational theories not only predict that proactive firms will enjoy more future benefits, but also more consistent benefits through time (Hillman and Hitt 1999) . Conditional on low levels of future cash ETR, we predict and find that proactive firms enjoy more sustainable
ETRs through time, which we proxy for using the standard deviation cash ETR (McGuire et al. 2012 ). In addition, we document that firms with more transitory investments in access do not receive the same benefits as those firms who make consistent investments in access over time.
Furthermore, our findings are robust to including controls for tax-specific lobbying actions by other firms and coalitions within the firm's industry.
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate political activity (CPA) generally as well as the literature on taxes and CPA specifically. The growing literature on CPA provides mixed or inconclusive evidence on how contributing firms benefit from their campaign financing activity. With little evidence of a link between PAC contributions and voting outcomes, researchers often question why firms give at all (Ansolabehere et al. 2003) . On the other hand, many of these studies ask: given the value of the benefits at stake, why are corporate contributions so low (e.g. Freed and Swenson 1995; Ansolabehere et al. 2003) ? Our paper adds new evidence to the branch of literature on CPA investigating the value firms derive from their campaign financing activity. First, we link tax-specific PAC support to tax-specific outcomes.
Second, our research design better captures the timing between investments in CPA and outcomes. By considering PAC support as part of an overall relational approach to CPA, we find that investments in on-going access to policymakers are associated with future tax benefits.
Other studies focus on the economic benefits that firms enjoy as a result of their lobbying efforts. Many of these studies argue that lobbying expenditures are more relevant than PAC contributions when considering performance outcomes because lobbying is greater in magnitude and less likely to be motivated by ideology (see Richter et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2013; Hill et al. 2013a) . Although these studies downplay the relevance of campaign financing and often omit PAC participation from their analyses altogether, political science and strategic management scholars document significant correlations between lobbying and campaign financing participation (Ansolabehere et al. 2002; Schuler et al. 2002; Hadani and Schuler 2013) . 2 Prior research generally considers returns to either PAC or lobbying expenditures, but not both (e.g. Cooper et al. 2010; Hill et al. 2013a; Richter et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2013) . Research that does consider the two tactics together often treats the two activities as independent activities (Schuler et al. 2002; Ansolabehere et al. 2002) . We posit a more nuanced relationship; firms with political connections will have the resources in place to more effectively address issues as they arise. Our results contribute to the overall literature on CPA and suggest 1) political tactics should not be studied in isolation, and 2) lobbying and PAC activities have a complementary effect on firm outcomes.
In a recent study, Alexander et al. (2009) estimate that firms that lobbied for the repatriation tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 received an average return in excess of $220 for every $1 spent, or 22,000%. While this return on investment estimate is compelling, because our evidence suggests firms who invest in a relation approach over time accrue the greatest benefits, we argue that this ROI could be overstated. We develop our hypothesis based on theory from political science which suggests that the political market place is best characterized by a repeat-play reciprocal favors model (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005) . In other words, rather than a spot market in which firms donate money to candidates in exchange for quid-pro-quo favors, the political market place is more subtle. Our results are consistent with this view and suggest that an important aspect of successful political strategies is a multi-period investment in the policy arena.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a review of literature on corporate political activity and further develop our hypothesis. In Section III, we describe the data used in our analysis and the details of methodology used to test our research questions. In Section IV, we present our descriptive statistics and primary regression results.
Section V reports the results of additional analyses, and Section VI concludes.
II. Hypothesis Development

Policy competition and corporate political strategy
The public policy arena can be thought of as a competitive market with suppliers (policymakers) and demanders (firms). 3 Firms develop different political strategies to compete in this market, and some emerge as winners having successfully ensured passage or prevention of particular legislation, or having garnered other political benefits (Keim 2001) . In the tax policy arena, success can come in the form of broadly applicable tax preferences, like an extension of the Research and Experimentation Credit or specially targeted tax breaks, which benefit a single firm or a small group of firms. For example, numerous special interest tax breaks were recently tucked into The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, including extended accelerated cost recovery for "motorsports entertainment complexes" 4 and special expensing for "certain film and television productions."
5
The overall objective of the firm's corporate political strategy is to achieve public policy outcomes in the competitive market that are favorable to firm's continued success (Hillman and Hitt 1999) . As Keim (2001) notes, the same forces that govern interactions between a firm and 3 See Hillman et al. (2004) and Lux et al. (2011) for comprehensive reviews of the literature on corporate political activity. 4 See Section 312 of P.L. 112-240 amending I.R.C Section 168(i)(15)(D). 5 See Section 317 of P.L. 112-240 amending I.R.C. Section 181(f).
suppliers of its production inputs (prior dealings, an established relationship, bargaining power) also influence interactions between the firm and suppliers of public policy. Mills et al. (2013) exploit differences in bargaining power and find that although politically sensitive firms incur tax-related political costs (i.e., pay higher federal taxes), this relation is moderated when firms have greater bargaining power. We focus on a different dimension of the competitive process and examine whether firms that follow a relational approach and invest in establishing political connections enjoy an incremental benefit.
Hillman and Hitt (1999) describe a relational approach to CPA as a long-term strategy that focuses on building connections necessary for continuous exchange. They differentiate relational firms from transactional firms who only engage in the political process sporadically for short-term exchanges with policymakers. In the following section we describe how supporting candidates via PACs, political connections and a relational approach to CPA are connected.
Investing in political connections
Prior research on the efficacy and value of campaign contributions is mixed and inconclusive. Some studies find that corporate campaign finance contributions are associated with positive wealth effects (Cooper et al. 2010) , while other studies find that PAC contributions are not associated with firm-level benefits (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2004; Forman 1988; Ansolabehere et al. 2003) . Recent studies find evidence that PAC contributions are negatively associated with shareholder value (Aggarwal et al. 2012; Coates IV 2012) . The authors of these studies posit that PAC contributions represent managerial consumption goods and thus reflect potential agency conflicts. 6 In their review of the literature on campaign contributions, 6 A related line of literature investigates the implications of additional disclosures related to corporate political activity (e.g. Bebchuck and Jackson Jr. 2013; Baloria et al. 2012 ). Ansolabehere et al. (2003) conclude that contributions are not a significant factor in explaining U.S. Congressional voting behavior. They also note that corporate PAC contributions are small, both relative to other forms of corporate political activity like lobbying, and to the total amount of money raised by candidates (Ansolabehere et al. 2003) . And yet, companies still invest in elections. So one piece of the campaign contribution puzzle is, if contributions are not significantly related to voting behavior or future firm benefits, why do firms continue to invest?
On the other hand, researchers ask: If contributions do affect outcomes, why do firms invest so little, given how much is at stake? Freed and Swenson (1995) note that PAC contributions are small relative to available tax rents. Moreover, there is wide heterogeneity in PAC spending; some firms give a lot while others do not invest at all (Freed and Swenson 1995) .
One of the challenges is to understand what PAC contributions represent. We follow a long line of literature which suggests that PAC contributions do not "buy" votes, but rather "buy" access to policymakers (e.g. Wright 1990; Humphries 1991; Austen-Smith 1995; Schuler et al. 2002) .
This literature suggests that PAC contributions represent table stakes or entrance fees into the overall political process (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001 Having access represents more than just face time with politicians, it may also amplify a firm's lobbying message (Wright 1990 benefits. In doing so, we seek to improve our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that generate future firm value.
Many studies investigate corporate political activity in settings related to specific legislation (e.g. Gupta and Swenson 2003; Alexander et al. 2009 ), but fewer studies look at the association between corporate political strategies and firm-specific performance outcomes (Hillman et al. 2004) . This is potentially problematic because political favors may not take the form of roll-call votes, but instead may come in the form of much more difficult to observe benefits, such as earlier access to information, changes in the content of legislation, prevention of unfavorable policy and more. Moreover, investments in CPA and the benefits that result do not occur simultaneously. Studying long-run tax avoidance allows us to investigate an issue-specific performance measure relevant to a broad sample of firms. At the same time, by broadening our study beyond a specific legislative event, we are able to examine the long-run benefits of CPA.
Recent studies of CPA have considered firm-specific tax performance outcomes (Hill et al. 2013b; Richter et al. 2009; Drope and Hansen 2008; Meade and Li 2012) . However, these studies focus on lobbying, arguing that lobbying is more directly related to influence and that lobbying expenditures dwarf campaign contributions. Richter et al. (2009) Hypothesis: Firms that follow a relational approach to CPA will accrue greater future tax benefits (i.e., investments in access over time enhance investments in influence).
III. Research Design
We proxy for future tax benefits using cross-sectional variation in long-run cash ETRs.
Our primary variables of interest are access to policymakers over time via campaign contributions and attempts to influence policy via lobbying expenditures. To test our hypothesis, we examine the association between access, influence and the interaction of access and influence on average cash ETR over t+1 to t+4. Cooper et al. (2010) create a measure of access to political candidates using the sum of supported candidates (House, Senate, and Presidential) over a rolling six year window. Because we are interested in the benefits that accrue to firms that develop relationships with policymakers who have influence over tax legislation, we draw from Cooper et al. (2010) to construct a taxspecific measure of access. Our measure captures the number of policymakers on the Senate
Measures of ACCESS and INFLUENCE
Finance and House Ways and Means Committees that a firm has provided PAC support to over the prior six-year period. 11 Specifically, ACCESS equals the number of supported tax-writing committee candidates for firm i in years t-5 to t as follows:
where, Cand jt,t-5 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm's PAC has contributed money to candidate j over the years t-5 to t. Similar to Cooper et al. (2010) , our long-run measure of supported candidates is designed to capture three house and one senate election cycle. We believe a six year measure enables us to capture firms who engage in the political process over time.
Corporations are prohibited from making contributions directly to federal election campaigns. 12 However, there are several ways in which corporations may legally participate in federal election activities. Specifically, corporations are permitted to establish political action committees, formally known as "separate segregated funds" (SSF), but more commonly referred to as PACs. 13 A PAC "is organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to elect and 11 Prior studies also recognize the relative importance of PAC contributions to members of Congress on tax-writing committees (Freed and Swenson 1995; Roberts and Bobek 2004 determine the number of tax-related policymakers a firm supports, as our measure of ACCESS.
The descriptive statistics documented by Cooper et al. (2010) reveal that a small percentage of firms participate in campaign financing, the average PAC contribution is fairly constant across candidates, and contributions to policymakers are not binding (i.e., on average, firms do not maximize the contribution limits). 15 As such, observed hard money contributions may not be sufficient to capture the connections that firms establish with policymakers over time. However, to the extent the number of candidates supported by hard money contributions proxies for overall firm investment in political connections, (i.e., including soft money contributions, or other forms of favors that are not publically disclosed) our tax-oriented modification of the primary index developed by Cooper et al. (2010) likely serves as a good proxy for the access that a firm establishes with influential policymakers over time.
We hypothesize that relational firms accrue greater benefits to their CPA because their investments in political connections magnify their investments in influencing policy through lobbying. We proxy for firms' investments in INFLUENCE using an estimate of tax lobbying expenditures for the two-year window prior to our measure of future tax benefits. We estimate tax-specific lobbying expenditures because we can only observe total lobbying expenditures directly; lobbying expenditures are not disaggregated and reported separately by issue. 16 To estimate tax-specific lobbying, we multiply the total amount of lobbying expenditures reported for each quarterly report by a ratio of the number of "TAX" issues included in the report to the total number of issues. 17 Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2002) we measure lobbying expenditures by two-year terms, thus we then sum this amount for firm i in years t-1 and t. Our influence measure is designed to capture one two-year session of congress, a long enough period that legislation can be impacted.
The benefit of following a relational approach to CPA
To test our hypothesis, whether firms that follow a relational approach to CPA will accrue greater future tax benefits, we employ the following ordinary least squares regression model:
where the dependent variable (CASH ETR) is a measure of future tax benefits equal to the firm's cash ETR in years t+1 through t+4. 18 Dyreng et al. (2008) suggest that annual ETRs demonstrate considerable variation and are not necessarily good proxies for long-run tax avoidance. Thus, we construct a four-year ETR measure to capture the future economic benefits of engaging in the political process. ACCESS is a measure of political connections to tax-writing members of
Congress measured from t-5 to t, and INFLUENCE is a measure of tax-related lobbying measured from t-1 to t. While we expect both ACCESS and INFLUENCE to be negatively associated with future cash ETR (i.e., β 1 and β 2 < 0), our primary interest is in the interaction of ACCESS and INFLUENCE. We posit that firms who pursue a relational approach to CPA will have the contacts and resources in place to influence legislation when important issues arise.
Hence, we predict that investments in ACCESS will magnify the effectiveness of investments in INFLUENCE (i.e., β 3 < 0).
We include several control variables identified in prior research as determinants of cash ETRs (Chen et al. 2010) : the natural log of total assets (SIZE), 19 gross property plant and equipment (PPE), foreign income (FOREIGN INCOME), research and development (R&D), leverage (LEVERAGE), change in pretax cash flow from operations (∆PTCFO), pretax return on assets (ROA), changes in tax-loss carryforwards (∆NOL), equity earnings in subsidiaries (ESUB), and the market to book ratio (MTB). In all specifications, we include a firm's cash ETR in year t to control for a firm's existing level of tax avoidance and better isolate the impact of political strategy. Because cash ETRs have been shown to vary by industry and over time (Dyreng et al. 2008) , we include year and industry fixed effects (using the 49 industries identified in Fama and French (1997) ). 20 We winsorize one-and four-year cash ETR measures at zero and one and all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to alleviate the effect of outliers.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to address serial correlation in the residuals (Petersen 2009 ).
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We also include corrections for firms' choices to engage in the political process via campaign financing (IMR ACCESS ) and via lobbying (IMR INFLUENCE ). See discussion below regarding the construction of these variables.
Self-Selection Correction
Prior research suggests that managers choose to engage in political activity to enhance the value of the firm (Hillman et al. 2004) . This choice introduces self-selection bias into our analysis. Specifically, the choice to engage in the political process is a function of both observable characteristics (e.g. firm size, resources and industry membership) and unobservable characteristics (e.g. demand for political favors), and either of these could be related to future tax cash ETRs. To address the affect of these potential correlated omitted variables, we employ a Heckman's (1979) (Hillman et al. 2004) .
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Numerous studies focus on how the political investments of a firm's industry peers affect its own choice to engage in the political arena e.g. (e.g. Bombardini and Trebbi 2012) . 22 To estimate these first-stage selection models we augment our politically active sample with a sample of all other CRSP/Compustat firms that meet our other sample selection requirements but are not politically active. 23 Gupta and Swenson (2003) find evidence that firms with more tax benefits at stake invest more in the political process (firm, officer and director PAC contributions). We would expect this to be true for both investments in ACCESS and INFLUENCE; however, since we focus on a broad sample and a long-run tax benefit measure rather than a particular piece of legislation, we do not attempt to estimate firm-specific available rents. 24 Prior studies also indicate that CPA is correlated with membership in a regulated industry and dependency on government purchases. Our sample does not include regulated industries, and we do not include a control for the amount of industry output purchased from the government because of data availability. We do not anticipate omitting this control will affect our results.
Collaboration is more likely to occur and free-riding is less likely to occur in concentrated industries; therefore, firms in concentrated industries are more likely to engage in CPA (Lux et al. 2011 Our use of a bivariate probit model as a method to control for separate but non-independent choices is consistent with prior research in accounting (Phillips 2003) . 27 The lobbying reports are filed with the Secretary of the Senate's Office of Public Records and are available by calendar year since 1998. The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) lobbying data include spending by ideological organizations, publicly traded firms, privately held firms, trade associations, and non-profit organizations. CRP does not use company identifiers (i.e., CUSIP, PERMNO, etc.), therefore we match on company name using a computer based algorithm. All matches generated from the algorithm are then visually inspected to ensure accuracy. 28 Links between firms and their PACs are manually constructed (see Cooper et al. 2010) . The official name of a PAC must include the full name of the connected organization, where a connected organization is the sponsoring organization, or the organization that establishes, administers or financially supports the PAC. This allows contributions from corporate sponsored PACs to be more easily identified and linked to Compustat. Two or more
We merge CRSP/Compustat data to FEC and lobbying data to form a comprehensive dataset of FEC contributions, lobbying expenditures, and annual firm accounting measures and test our hypothesis with respect to future cash ETRs. To be consistent with prior research (see Dyreng et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2010) , we exclude 1), firms incorporated outside of the United States, 2) regulated firms (SIC 6000-6999 and 4900-4949), 3) firm-years with negative pretax income, and 4) firm-years missing necessary data to calculate control variables. For our main tests, we require to be engaged in the political process, which we describe as "politically active"
firms. To be politically active a firm must either participate in 1) campaign financing, or 2)
lobbying activity, but we do not require firms to participate in both. Table 1 , Panel A provides general descriptive statistics for our model variables. We document that the mean and standard deviation of CASH ETR t+1,t+4 over our sample period are 28.8% and 19.5%, respectively. These are consistent with descriptives presented in prior research (Dyreng et al. 2008 ). In addition, we notice variation among our firms along other dimensions (foreign income, research and development, and property plant and equipment), indicating that within our sample of politically active firms, we have a diverse cross-section of firms. (Schuler et al. 2002) , researchers also note wide heterogeneity in the choice of political tactics (Ansolabehere et al. 2002; Schuler et al. 2002) Consistent with this, we find that 42% of firmyear observations exhibit both general ACCESS and general INFLUENCE, while 23% and 35%
IV. Descriptive Statistics and Primary Regression Results
Descriptive statistics
of firm-year observations only exhibit one or the other. These percentages are relatively consistent when considering tax-specific ACCESS and INFLUENCE, except that there are noticeably fewer firm-year observations that only exhibit tax-specific lobbying. Table 2 presents correlations among our regression variables. As expected, our variables of ACCESS and INFLUENCE are strongly related to firm size; larger firms are more likely to expend resources and engage in the political process. Consistent with studies that document a high correlation between lobbying and campaign financing (Ansolabehere et al. 2002; Schuler et al. 2002) , we find preliminary evidence of the potentially complementary relation between these two political tactics. Additionally, ACCESS and INFLUENCE are negatively correlated with 29 In classifying a firm as politically active we consider the firm's general, rather than tax-specific CPA. 30 In untabulated tests, we include an additional control for general lobbying in our regression specifications. Our results remain consistent.
future cash ETR, providing preliminary evidence that involvement in the political process is associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. Table 3 presents the industry composition of a comparable sample of Compustat firms and our sample of tax politically active firms. The Compustat firms include any firm-years which meet our sample selection criteria, but we do not require political activity. We note that the percentage of firms in our sample who are politically active in the tax arena varies by industry. In particular, more than 50% of observations in the precious metals, tobacco, beer and liquor, coal, and ship building industries participate in the political process. On the opposite end of the spectrum, less than 10% of observations in the electrical equipment, apparel, wholesale, software, construction materials, recreation, measuring and control equipment, and fabricated products industries engage in tax political activities. These patterns clearly indicate that the number of firms engaged in political activity varies by industry, thus in Section V we also test whether our results are robust to industry lobbying efforts. Finally, we note that some of the most politically active industries exhibit cash ETRs well below the statutory rate for our sample period. However, the tobacco industry, which reports 62% of firms as politically active, reports a mean four-year cash ETR of 45.9%, well above the statutory rate. Table 4 provides evidence consistent with theories that suggest PAC support, as part of an overall strategy to influence policy outcomes, should exhibit certain characteristics. First, in Panel A, we rank firms by their political connections. We find that lobbying efforts are increasing across ACCESS quintiles, characteristic of access-oriented PAC support (i.e., support with the intention of gaining access to legislators as part of an overall strategy to influence policy outcomes), rather than ideologically-oriented support (Ansolabehere et al. 2002) . Firm-year observations in the top quintile of ACCESS spend more than 60% of the total lobbying expenditures among our politically active observations. Moreover, firms in the highest ACCESS quintile spend significantly more on both general and tax-specific lobbying compared to those in the lowest ACCESS quintile, and these differences are statistically different (p < 0.01 and p < 0.01, respectively).
In Panel B, for all firm-year observations we compare the coefficient of variation in PAC contributions to tax-writing members of Congress for the period t-5 to t across high (above the median) and low (below the median) ACCESS firms. Theories about relational firms predict these firms will make both greater overall investment in political connections as well as more consistent investment in policymakers. Consistent with this, in Panel B we note that firm-year observations with high ACCESS tend to contribute more, and more regularly than firm-year observations with low ACCESS. there are winners and losers in the policy arena. Corporations seek to develop political strategies that will increase the likelihood of success, but success is not guaranteed. We argue that one successful strategy is maintaining access to policymakers over time, which magnifies attempts to influence policy.
Primary regression results
V. Additional Analyses
Sustainable tax benefits
Our results thus far provide evidence that the interaction of access and influence is associated with lower future cash ETRs. Firms identified as long-run tax avoiders by Dyreng et al. (2008) may not all be successful at consistently avoiding tax, but vary in the degree to which 31 Researchers could interpret this finding as suggesting that lobbying is more influential than PAC; however, our hypothesis suggests that the interaction of the two is important. mean that the two activities are mutually exclusive. In other words, some firms are able to reduce both the mean and variability of cash ETR through time. We argue that proactive involvement in the policy arena, and specifically, a relational approach to CPA is one potential strategy that will not only result in low levels of future cash ETRs, but also consistently low future cash ETRs.
Recall that Hillman and Hitt (1999) argue successful firms in the political marketplace will be proactive. In addition to other benefits, researchers posit that proactive behavior in the public policy arena will lead to more consistent benefits over time (Baysinger 1984; Weidenbaum 1980) . We argue that our proxy for access is akin to continued exchange with policymakers over time, and consistent with the relational theories proposed by Hillman and Hitt (1999) , access should enhance attempts to influence policy, leading to more sustainable economic benefits over time. Identifying an important determinant of sustainable tax minimization is relevant given the findings of recent research that document an association between the second moment properties of taxable income and earnings persistence, cost of capital and measures of firm risk (McGuire et al. 2012; Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Guenther et al. 2013 ).
To investigate this second potential benefit, we consider a dependent variable that captures future variation in cash ETRs, the standard deviation of cash ETR (SD CASH ETR) from t+1 to t+4. We are specifically interested in whether the firms that achieve low levels of cash ETRs are also able to achieve more sustainable cash ETRs over time. Thus, we include an indicator variable CASH ETR LOW for observations that are below the median of future cash ETR from t+1 to t+4, and interact this variable with our variables of interest, ACCESS and INFLUENCE, and relevant control variables. 33 We report the regression results of for this test in Table 6 . We expect a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between ACCESS, INFLUENCE, and CASH ETR LOW (i.e., β 7 < 0), consistent with the idea that the impact of access to candidates over time on attempts to influence policy is associated not only with future economic benefits, but more sustainable future economic benefits (SD CASH ETR).
Beyond our variables of interest, in column 1, we include additional determinants of the standard deviation of cash ETR identified by Guenther et al. (2013) : SIZE, PPE, FOREIGN INCOME, R&D, LEVERAGE, and ESO BENEFIT. In Column 2 we include additional factors to control for performance (SD PTCFO, SD ROA, ΔNOL), determinants of tax avoidance (ESUB), and growth (MTB). We note that our results are not sensitive to including these additional controls. We find that the coefficient on ACCESS x INFLUENCE x CASH ETR LOW is negative and significant (p < 0.10), We interpret this as evidence that, conditional on the level of tax avoidance, firms who strategically engage in the political process by gaining and maintaining ongoing relationships with influential policymakers and lobbying for tax-specific benefits, also enjoy lower variability in outcomes.
Consistency of Investment
Our hypothesis posits that firms that pursue a relational approach to CPA will accrue greater benefits to their CPA. One characteristic of a relational approach is consistent investment in access, and firms who make less consistent investments should not enjoy the same future benefits as those who make more consistent investments. To test this, we examine the sub-sample of firms who engage in campaign financing (i.e., ACCESS > 0). In Table 4 we document that, on average, low ACCESS firm-year observations exhibit greater variability in contributions over time. However, we recognize that low ACCESS does not necessarily preclude a consistent pattern of spending. From the results in Table 5 we interpret that the level of ACCESS is negatively associated with a firm's future cash ETR. Within firms who engage in campaign financing, we expect firms who consistently engage in the political process will accrue greater benefits. Thus, we examine our cash ETR model including CV_ACCESS, the coefficient of variation of the firm's campaign contribution dollars over the six-year period t-5 to t. We expect that higher levels of CV_ACCESS will be associated with higher levels of cash ETR. We report the results of this test in Table 7 . We note that the coefficient on CV_ACCESS, which captures the effect of consistent, ongoing, relational campaign financing, is positive and significant (p < 0.05). We interpret the results in Table 7 as confirming that among firms with ACCESS, those that maintain more consistent relationships across time (as proxied by less variability in campaign financing support) accrue greater benefits.
Industry lobbying
Given the findings of our main analysis, one concern might be that we are not adequately controlling for collective action. In other words, the negative association between our interaction of interest and future cash ETRs may be a result of collective action from industry lobbying. In untabulated tests, we address this in two ways. First, we aggregate firm-level lobbying across all firms in industry i for years t-1 through t, excluding the focal firm (INFLUENCE OTHER ). Second, we estimate industry-level lobbying using data from the CRP website (INFLUENCE   INDUSTRY   ) .
34 34 To match industry-level data to our firm-level data, we utilize CRP's industry coding system and manually reconcile this to the forty-nine industries as defined in (Fama and French 1997) .
The construction of these variables otherwise follows the construction of INFLUENCE in our primary analysis (i.e., we use the ratio of the number of "TAX" issues, divided by all other issues associated with a report). The objective of these measures is to control for tax-specific lobbying from other sources within firm f's industry. When we re-estimate equation (1), we find that the results from our primary analysis are robust to including these controls.
VI. Conclusion
Firms participate in the political marketplace because they hope to garner political favors that are beneficial to the firm: favorable legislation, favorable regulation, redistribution of government wealth, etc. To compete in the political marketplace, firms develop different political strategies. In this study, we investigate firms who adopt a relational approach to corporate political activity. In particular, we examine whether investments in access to policymakers over time enhance attempts to influence tax policy via lobbying expenditures and examine whether differences in political strategies help explain variation in long-run tax avoidance.
We find that the tax benefits associated with investments in tax-related lobbying accrue to firms who have established relationships with key policymakers (i.e., those who have made investments in gaining access to candidates over time). We also find that, conditional on low levels of future cash ETR, proactive firms enjoy more sustainable future tax benefits (i.e., lower standard deviation of future cash ETR). In addition analyses, we document that firms with more transitory investments in access do not receive the same benefits as those firms who make consistent investments in access over time. Furthermore, our findings are robust to including controls for tax-specific lobbying actions by other firms and coalitions within the firm's industry.
Our hypothesis is relevant given the current debate on tax reform. However, we believe our main finding, that investments in access and influence are complements, generalizes to other settings. Relative to studies that look to link political participation with broad performance measures such as earnings or market returns, our setting and measures allow for us to look for a relation between political participation and a specific, related policy benefit. On the other hand, because we focus on a policy area that is likely to affect many firms, our evidence is also more generalizable relative to prior studies that examine the outcomes of a single piece of legislation or single political event. In their review of the literature on CPA, Lux et al. (2011) call for additional research on the performance effects of CPA, and note that, in particular, less is known about how CPA affects performance. Our study looks at a specific measure of performance and considers how firms benefit from the use of two complementary tactics as part of an overall corporate political strategy.
Citizens United has fueled and renewed interest among academics, regulators, investors and ordinary citizens about how corporations operate in the political arena. Recent studies consider the costs and benefits of additional disclosure regarding CPA in public financial statements (Baloria et al. 2012; Bebchuck and Jackson Jr. 2013) . Although some studies highlight the potential agency conflicts associated with CPA (Aggarwal et al. 2012; Coates IV 2012; Baloria et al. 2012) , our study suggests that political tactics are complements, and that a relational approach to CPA generates valuable future economic benefits. Furthermore, our results suggest that future researchers consider the complexity of the political arena both in terms of the combination of tactics and the timing of investments and resulting outcomes.
There is a debate going on in Washington. There will be winners and losers. Our study suggests that firms who have already developed relationships with policymakers will be better positioned to inform this debate. The cash effective tax rate, defined as cash tax paid (TXPD) for the four-year period beginning in t+1 and ending in t+4, divided by pretax book income (PI) for firm i over the same four-year period. SD CASH ETR (t+1,t+4) The standard deviation of CASH ETR, defined as the standard deviation of annual CASH ETR for the four-year period beginning in t+1 and ending in t+4.
Variables of Interest
ACCESS (t-5,t)
The natural logarithm of one plus the sum of supported candidates from the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees over rolling six-year windows, measured at the end of year t; when missing reset to zero. INFLUENCE (t-1,t) Tax-specific lobbying (in millions), measured as the ratio of the number of "TAX" issues, divided by all other issues. This ratio is then multiplied by the total amount of lobbying expenditures reported for each report. We then sum this amount for firm i in years t-1 through t.
Control Variables
CASH ETR t
The cash effective tax rate, defined as cash tax paid (TXPD) for period t, divided by pretax book income (PI) for firm i for period t. SIZE (t+1,t+4) The natural logarithm of total assets (AT) for firm i.
PPE (t+1,t+4) Gross Property, Plant and Equipment (PPEG) divided by beginning total assets (AT). FOREIGN INCOME (t+1,t+4) Pretax Foreign Income (PIFO) divided by beginning total assets (AT). R&D (t+1,t+4) Research and Development expense (XRD) divided by beginning total assets (AT); when missing reset to zero. LEVERAGE (t+1,t+4) Book Leverage, defined as the sum of long-term debt (DLTT) and long-term debt in current liabilities (DLC) divided by beginning total assets (AT). ∆PTCFO (t+1,t+4) Change in pretax cash flow (OANCF -XIDOC + TXPD) divided by beginning total assets (AT). ROA (t+1,t+4) Pretax Return on Assets, defined as pretax income (PI) before extraordinary items (XI) divided by beginning total assets (AT).
∆NOL (t+1,t+4) Change in Net Operating Losses, defined as the change in taxloss carryforward (TLCF) from period t+1 to t+4 divided by beginning total assets (AT). ESUB (t+1,t+4) Equity earnings in subsidiaries (ESUB) divided by beginning total assets (AT). MTB (t+1,t+4) Market to book ratio, defined as market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO) divided by beginning book value of equity (CEQ). ESO BENEFIT (t+1,t+4) The four-year sum of excess tax benefit of stock options (TXBCOF) scaled by lagged total assets. SD ROA (t+1,t+4) Standard deviation of a firm's ROA measured over the period t+1 to t+4. SD CF (t+1,t+4) Standard deviation of a firm's cash flows measured over the period t+1 to t+4.
CASH ETR LOW (t+1, t+4) Indicator variable set to 1 for observations with four-year future Cash ETR below the sample median for period t+1 to t+4. CV_ACCESS (t-5,t) Six-year coefficient of variation of campaign contribution dollars for the period t-5 to t, where only campaign contributions to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees are considered.
First-stage Variables
Ln(SALES) t The natural logarithm of firm sales (SALE).
Ln(EMPLOYEES) t
The natural logarithm of the number of employees in millions (EMP). Ln(BM) t The natural log of the book-to-market ratio, defined as book value of equity (CEQ) divided by market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO). LEVERAGE t` Book Leverage, defined as the sum of long-term debt (DLTT) and long-term debt in current liabilities (DLC) divided by beginning total assets (AT FOREIGN INCOME (t+1, t+4) R&D (t+1,t+4) LEVERAGE (t+1,t+4) ∆PTCFO (t+1,t+4) ROA (t+1,t+4) ∆NOL (t+1,t+4) ESUB (t+1,t+4) MTB (t+1,t+4) ESO BENEFIT (t+1,t+4) ACCESS (t-5,t) INFLUENCE (t-1,t) CASH ETR (t+1,t+4) Fama and French (1997) .
To be consistent with prior research, the following industries have been excluded from the analysis: utilities, banking, insurance, real estate, and trading. (Petersen 2009 ).
